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Abstract
We modify the vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly model by Andre´
et al. (2009) replacing Bertrand with Cournot behaviour to show
that firms may spontaneously adopt a green technology even in the
complete absence of any form of regulation.
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1 Introduction
The Porter Hypothesis (Porter, 1990, 1991) challenges the view according to
which any form of environmental regulation necessarily hinders firms’ profit
perspectives. Indeed, according to Porter, environmental regulation may
induce eﬃciency and encourage innovations.
Several contributions nested in the debate triggered by this claim have
brought to the fore a number of scenarios where the Porter Hypothesis may
apply (see Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Simpson and Bradford, 1996;
Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw, 1999; and Hart, 2004). In particular, Andre´ et
al. (2009) support the Porter Hypothesis by arguing that, in a vertically
diﬀerentiated duopoly with Bertrand competition, where firms can decide
whether to invest in green R&D or not, it is possible to drive the industry
to an equilibrium where both firms choose to adopt the green standard in
presence of a streamlined regulation taking the form of a lump-sum tax levied
on the brown technology.
Here, we extend the analysis carried out by Andre´ et al. (2009) assuming
Cournot competition between firms at the market stage. The issue of why
and when firms choose to be quantity- or price-setting agents has been lively
discussed in the theory of industrial organization, pointing out that price
(respectively, quantity) competition fits best industries where firms’ capacity
constraints are absent or loose (resp., tight).1 This appears to be the case,
e.g., in the car industry, where a firm’s plant size matters. Additionally, this is
a prototypical market where the environmental implications of production are
relevant, and the existence of appropriate incentives for investments aimed
at the attainment of green product qualities is a hot issue. In fact, casual
1As is well known, the first analysis of capacity-constrained price competition is in
Edgeworth (1897). In the modern literature, see Beckman (1967); Levitan and Shubik
(1972); Kreps and Scheinkman (1983); Singh and Vives (1984); Osborne and Pitchik
(1986), to mention only a few.
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observation suggests that several large firms like Honda, Toyota and VW-
Audi are investing (or are about to invest) massive resources in R&D for
clean technologies, without being subject to a specific form of taxation on
any brown technology currently in use, which are instead regulated through
minimum quality standards (like Euro V). Hence, one is led to think that
these eﬀorts must be driven by profit incentives largely - if not altogether -
independent of the regulatory framework.
This is precisely the bottom line of our analysis. By replacing Bertrand
with Cournot, the resulting softer competition at the market stage delivers
the appropriate incentives for firms to standardise the industry onto the green
product, in absence of any regulation whatsoever. This opens a perspective
that stretches even beyond the Porter Hypothesis, prompting for the inves-
tigation of scenarios where firms governed by unconstrained profit incentives
may pursue projects ultimately leading to socially eﬃcient outcomes.
2 The model
We adopt largely the same setup as in Andre´ et al. (2009). We describe a
vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly under complete information, where single-
product firms, 1 and 2, decide whether to supply a high- or low-quality good,
identified by qH > qL. Quality has both hedonic and environmental features;
in particular, while qL involves some undesirable environmental externality,
i.e., it is brown, while qH is green. the individual firm’s profit function is
πij = (pij − cxij)xij, i, j = H,L, (1)
where xij indicates the output level of firm i (hence, in the remainder the first
subscript will consistently refer to firm i while the second will refer to the
rival). As it appears from (1), the production technology involves variable
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costs, which are quadratic in the output level:
Cij = cx2ij, c > 0. (2)
For the moment, we abstract from any fixed costs related to installed capacity
or the R&D eﬀort required for the attainment of either quality level. We
will come back to this aspect of technology in the remainder. Similarly,
we suppose that firms are not subject to any regulatory measure, unlike
what appears in Andre´ et al. (2009), where firms pay a lump-sum tax when
supplying the brown variety.
Using (1) we may describe three possible cases: either both firms sup-
ply the green (resp., brown) standard, so that consumers indeed purchase a
homogeneous good, or they opt for diﬀerent quality levels.
The demand side is as in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979): there exists a continuum of consumers indexed by their marginal
willingness to pay for quality θ ∈ [θ, θ], with θ = θ − 1. The distribution of
consumers is uniform, with density f(θ) = 1, so that the total mass of con-
sumers is also equal to one. Each consumer buys at most one unit of variety
i = H,L, whereby his net utility is either U = θqi − pij ≥ 0, or nil if he
doesn’t buy. As Andre´ et al. (2009), we focus on the case where the mar-
ket is partially covered. The construnction of the demand system is best
approached by considering first the case where firms supply diﬀerent quality
levels. If so, there exists a consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying the
low-quality good and not buying at all. His location along the spectrum of
the marginal willingness to pay is given by the ratio eθ = pLH/qL. Given
generic prices and qualities, the location of the consumer indiﬀerent between
the two varieties is bθ = (pHL − pLH)/(qH − qL), so that the system of direct
market demands is xHL = θ−bθ and xLH = bθ−eθ. This is what one needs to
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use in order to model Bertrand behaviour, while inverse demands
pHL =
¡
θ − xHL
¢
qH − qLxLH
pLH =
¡
θ − xHL − xLH
¢
qL
(3)
are to be used under Cournot competition. If instead both firms adopt the
same quality standard (either green or brown), demands (3) symmetrically
collapse onto:
pii =
¡
θ − 2xii
¢
qi, i = H,L. (4)
The interaction between firms is fully noncooperative and takes place in
two stages. In the first, firms set their respective quality levels; then, in
the second, which is the proper market stage, they compete in outputs a` la
Cournot. The solution concept applied is the subgame perfect equilibrium
by backward induction.
3 The game
To begin with, we have to solve the three possible Cournot subgames. The
fastest way to do it is to focus on the case in which firms supply diﬀerent
standards. The first order conditions for profit maximization are:
∂πHL
∂xHL
=
¡
θ − 2xHL
¢
qH − 2cxHL − qLxLH = 0
∂πLH
∂xLH
=
¡
θ − xHL − 2xLH
¢
qL − 2cxLH = 0
(5)
yielding:
x∗HL =
θ [2cqH + (2qH − qL) qL]
4c (qH + qL + c) + (4qH − qL) qL
x∗LH =
θ (2c+ qH) qL
4c (qH + qL + c) + (4qH − qL) qL
(6)
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The resulting Cournot-Nash profits are:
π∗HL =
θ
2
[2cqH + (2qH − qL) qL]2 (c+ qH)
[4c (qH + qL + c) + (4qH − qL) qL]2
π∗LH =
θ
2
(2c+ qH)
2 q2L (c+ qL)
[4c (qH + qL + c) + (4qH − qL) qL]2
(7)
The alternative cases where firms symmetrically choose the same standard
(either brown or green) obtain from (6-7) by imposing qi = qj.2 This yields:
xii =
θqi
3qi + 2c
, i = H,L,
π∗ii =
θ
2
q2i (qi + 2c)
2 (c+ qi)
[3q2i + 4c (2qi + c)]
2
(8)
Before proceeding any further, it is worth oserving that
∂xii
∂qi
=
2θc
(3qi + 2c)
2 > 0 (9)
entailing that total industry output is strictly higher when both firms adopt
the green standard than when they adopt the brown one. The equilibrium
price in the symmetric cases writes as follows:
pii =
θqi (2c+ qi)
3qi + 2c
, i = H,L, (10)
with
∂pii
∂qi
=
θ [4c2 + qi (4c+ 3qi)]
(3qi + 2c)
2 > 0 (11)
so that switching from brown to green qualities brings about an increase in
price. Therefore, a priori, if the whole industry increases the quality standard
2Under quantity competition, it is not necessary to build up the demand functions for
the homogeneous good case as it is instead under Bertrand competition (see Andre´ et al.,
2009, p. 185)
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symmetrically, the net eﬀect on consumer surplus is ambiguous, depending
upon the balance between the increase in quality and output on one side and
the increase in price on the other.
In the general case where firms supply diﬀerentiated products, consumer
surplus is:
CSij =
Z bθ
eθ (vqL − pLH) dv +
Z θ
bθ (vqH − pHL) dv
=
qLx2LH + xHL (qHxHL + 2qLxLH)
2
(12)
which, in the symmetric cases, becomes:
CSii =
2θ
2
q3i
(3qi + 2c)
2 (13)
with
∂CSii
∂qi
=
6θ
2
q2i (qi + 2c)
(3qi + 2c)
3 > 0 (14)
On this basis, we can formulate:
Lemma 1 The symmetric switch from brown to green quality involves an
increase in consumer surplus.
This of course is driven by the fact that the balance between the increase
in all variables involved is such that consumers are happy to purchase larger
amounts of the green variety even if this happens at a higher price.
We are now in a position to investigate the symultaneous choice of the
quality level, either H or L, by the two firms. As in Andre´ et al. (2009, p.
187), this is described by the reduced-form stage appearing in Matrix 1.
2
H L
1 H π∗HH ;π
∗
HH π
∗
HL;π
∗
LH
L π∗LH ;π
∗
HL π
∗
LL;π
∗
LL
Matrix 1
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The equilibrium analysis can be carried out by assessing the sign of three
key inequalities involving the payoﬀs apeparing in Matrix 1. To begin with,
consider the main diagonal, along which we have:
π∗HH − π∗LL ∝ 4c (qH + c) [cqH + (c+ 3qH) qL] + (2c+ 3qH)
2 q2L > 0. (15)
This establishes the superiority of the green standard in terms of the reuslting
profit incentives for firms, the explanation being that the higher production
costs associated with supplying the green standard rather than the brown one
are more than compensated by the corresponding increase in market price
generated by consumers’ hedonic inclinations.
Then, we move on to consider the inequalities by rows or columns:
π∗HH − π∗LH ∝ 16 (qH + c)
3 (qL + c)− q2Hq2L > 0 (16)
as q3HqL > q
2
Hq
2
L; moreover,
π∗HL − π∗LL ∝ [36qH + qL (qL − 16)] + 4c
£
3 (10qH − qL) q3L+ (17)
c (4c (c (qH + qL) + qL (5qH + 3qL))) + (37qH + 9qL) q2L
¤
> 0
since 36qH − 16qL > 0.
Therefore, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, we can formulate the
following claim:
Proposition 2 Pure profit incentives yield (H,H) as the unique Nash equi-
librium at the intersection of strictly dominant strategies, in absence of any
form of regulation. The equilibrium outcome is also Pareto-eﬃcient for firms.
That is, the stage game depicted in Matrix 1 is not a prisoners’ dilemma.
The source of the spontaneous alignement of firms on the green quality in an
unregulated market is to be found in the less aggressive nature of Cournot
behaviour as opposed to Bertrand. This ultimately makes the lump-sum tax
appearing in Andre´ et al. (2009) redundant.
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Combining Proposition 2 with the additional facts that (i) consumer sur-
plus is higher in (H,H) than in (L,L) - as we know from Lemma 1 - and (ii)
the negative environmental externality curtailing welfare in (L,L) disappears
altogether in (H,H), it is also true that
Corollary 3 Social welfare is higher in (H,H) than in (L,L) .
The foregoing analysis can be generalised as follows. The result outlined
in Proposition 2 clearly extends to the case where there exists a symmetric
fixed cost F , and may indeed hold even in the more general case where
developing either quality standard requires some R&D eﬀort summarised in
a quality-specific fixed cost FK , K = H,L, with FH > FL. This can be
easily appreciated by observing that the presence of quality-specific fixed
costs modifies the equilibrium values of objective functions as follows:
bπ∗ij = π∗ij − F, (18)
whereby Proposition 2 applies provided that the inequalities
bπ∗HH > bπ∗LL ⇔ π∗HH − π∗LL > FH − FLbπ∗HH > bπ∗LH ⇔ π∗HH − π∗LH > FH − FLbπ∗HL > bπ∗LL ⇔ π∗HL − π∗LL > FH − FL
(19)
holds across the three admissible cases simultaneously. This can be sum-
marised in:
Corollary 4 If min {π∗HH − π∗LL, π∗HH − π∗LH , π∗HL − π∗LL} > FH − FL, then
(H,H) is the unique Nash equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies of the
game, in presence of asymmetric fixed costs of quality improvement.
A straightforward addendum to the above Corollary is that, whenever
(H,H) is the equilibrium, then it remains also socially optimal.
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4 Concluding remarks
We have revisited the vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly model by Andre´ et al.
(2009) under quantity-setting behaviour, to highlight the striking fact that
softening market competition may have far-reaching consequences as far as
the environmental performance of the industry is concerned. Indeed, our
simple model is something more than a vindication of the Porter Hypothesis,
as it shows that private and social incentives towards the adoption of green
technologies may in fact be reciprocally aligned.
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